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Comments
PUBLIC DISORDER OFFENSES UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA'S NEW CRIMES CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
Offenses against the public order are among the most common-
ly committed1 and easily observable 2 crimes. Much of the general
public gets its primary view--either as participant or observer-
of the workings of our criminal justice system within the context
of such crimes. Whether it is the relatively minor offense of dis-
orderly conduct or the more serious one of riot, police and judicial
treatment of these offenses is a matter of great community con-
cern. 4 Although it is society's basic interest in preserving public
peace and order which engenders criminal statutes covering the
disorder offenses, such statutes often involve serious questions
concerning the individual's basic constitutional rights of free
1. Except for drunkenness, more arrests are made for disorderly
conduct than for any other offense. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 117
(1967). In the United States as a whole and in Pennsylvania over one-
third of the arrests for non-traffic criminal offenses are for public drunken-
ness and disorderly conduct. PNNsYLVANiA CRIME COMMISSION, TASK
FoRcE REPORT: ASSESSMENT OF CRIME AND CRImINAL JusncE IN PENNSYL-
vANiA 25-27 (1969).
2. Public disorder crimes are, by definition, public and visible of-
fenses. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5501-03 (Supp. 1973).
3. "[T]his is a most important area of criminal administration, af-
fecting the largest number of defendants, involving a great ptroion of
police activity, and powerfully influencing the view of public justice held
by millions of people." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1961).
4. See REPORT OF = E NATIONAL CoiMISSION ON CiVm DISORDERS
(1968).
speech and assembly.5 This clash between statutory efforts to
secure law and order and the rights of the individual to freely ex-
press himself through speech and assembly has been clearly de-
picted by the persistent civil rights and anti-war demonstrations
and the violent urban riot 7 of the last decade. The ability of a
public disorder statute to withstand constitutional attack on the
grounds of violation of the first amendment freedoms depends, to
a large extent, upon the nature of the balance it strikes between
these two conflicting interests;" the balancing process is a difficult
and delicate one for both the legislature9 and the courts.'0
In this light, it is the author's purpose to examine the statu-
tory treatment of public disorder crimes under Chapter 55-
Riots, Disorderly Conduct and Related Offenses-of the newly en-
acted Pennsylvania Crimes Code. The sections to be discussed 1 '
include: Sec. 5501-Riot; Sec. 5502-Failure of disorderly persons
to disperse upon official order; and Sec. 5503-Disorderly conduct.
To this end, the Comment will examine the general common
law origin of public disorder crimes, Pennsylvania law prior to
the enactment of the new Code, the changes brought about by the
language of the new Code, and first amendment questions raised
by Pennsylvania's new statutory definitions of public disorder
crimes.
II. THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF PuBLIc DISORDER CRnVIES
At common law, offenses against the public order are included
under the general heading of breach of the peace. Breach of the
peace is a generic term covering conduct which disturbs the
public tranquility. It is not associated with any particular indi-
vidual act, but rather includes any violation of the public peace,
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
6. See, e.g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1969) where state
disorderly conduct convictions of Vietnam anti-war demonstrators were re-
versed since the convictions were thought to have been based on the of-
fensiveness of the demonstrators' views rather than the law.
7. "The recent riots in American cities have provided the most strik-
ing and visible example of crime in the streets. All but a few Americans
have been affected by these massive outbursts of violence and disorder."
PA. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
8. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
9. See notes 135-40 and accompanying text infra.
10. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967); THE PREsI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as CHALLENGE OF CRnIE].
11. The other sections of Chapter 55 have been excluded as irrelevant
to the purposes of this Comment. The excluded sections are PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5504-14 (Supp. 1973).
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order or decorum. 12 It includes conduct which tends to incite
others to disturb the peace, as well as actual breaches of the peace
by the individual himself."" It has been said that the "gist of the
offense is the tendency of the defendant's act to annoy and disturb
the people affected to such an extent as to deprive them of their
right to peace and quiet." 14
Prior to the first codifications of crimes in England, breach of
peace was thought of as generally synonymous with treason 5 or
crime itself.16 Regardless of the particular crimes charged, all of
the indictments of that time included some phrase such as "against
the peace of the King."' 7 As the law developed and criminal
charges became more individuated, 8 distinctions among crimes
were made according to the interests which they affected. There
is an obvious social interest in maintaining the peace and order of
the community.'9 Any unjustified wilful action which contravenes
this interest is punishable at common law, 20 such actions usually
being categorized as affray, rout, riot or unlawful assembly.
21 If
the disruptive conduct does not fall within one of the enumerated
categories and it is still violative of the social interest in maintain-
ing order, it is known at common law simply as a breach of the
peace.
22
Disorderly conduct, as such, was not known as an offense at
common law. The offense is entirely a creature of the statute or
local ordinance which creates it. It covers the same general area
of conduct as common law breach of the peace; disorderly con-
duct, however, is somewhat broader in scope "so that a person who
12. Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720, 742 (E.D. Pa.), a! 'd, 392 U.S.
646 (1968).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Kessler, 213 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1954)
where it was described as "a disturbance of public order by an act of vio-
lence, or by an act likely to produce violence, or which by causing con-
sternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community."
Id. at 56.
14. J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 483 (1934).
15. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 586 (7th ed. 1967).
16. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 399 (2d ed. 1969).
17. Id.
18. The English Riot Act of 1714, 1 Geo. I, Stat. 2, c.5, made it a felony
for 12 or more rioters to continue together for one hour after a magistrate's
proclamation to disperse.
19. "The peace is the very end and foundation of civil society,"
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (1765).
See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
20. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 400.
21. These offenses will be treated in detail in the discussion of Penn-
sylvania law prior to the new Crimes Code. See Section III infra.
22. PERKINs, supra note 16, at 400.
commits a breach of the peace is necessarily guilty of disorderly
conduct, but all disorderly conduct is not necessarily a breach of
the peace.'23  Generally speaking, disorderly conduct has been de-
fined as "an act which tends to breach the peace or to disturb those
people who hear or see it, or to endanger the morals, safety or
health of the community or of a class of persons or a family.
'24
However, since it is a wholly statutory offense, its meaning in each
jurisdiction can be gleaned only by reference to the appropriate
statute.25  Oftentimes, the disorderly conduct statute serves a
catch-all function in order to punish those types of conduct tending
toward a breach of the peace which are not otherwise specifically
prohibited by law.2 6 This function may be served by broad, gen-
eral language or by listing the particular conduct intended to be
covered; 27 but whichever method is used in a particular disorderly
conduct statute, the attendant precision of language hoped for in
any criminal statute2 8 is often lacking. 29 These inadequacies may
be due, in large part, to the relative paucity of interest accorded
such provisions by legal scholars. In fact, until recently, this en-
tire area of the law has not received the widespread, detailed at-
tention from legislative draftsmen and legal scholars30 needed in
order to clear up the frequent generalities3' which pervade the
present statutory and common law language.
III. PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC DISORDER LAW PRIOR TO
THE NEW CRIMES CODE
Prior to the recent enactment of a new Crimes Code, the sub-
stantive criminal law of Pennsylvania was contained in the 1939
Penal Code.3 2 In addition to the crimes delineated therein, all
23. 12 AM. JuR. Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 1 (1964).
24. Id.
25. Disorderly conduct in Pennsylvania prior to the enactment of the
new Crimes Code will be discussed in a later section. See Section III infra.
26. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
27. See text accompanying notes 135-167 infra for a discussion of the
constitutional problems with such an approach. See also Annot., 12 ALR
3d 1448 (1967) for a compilation of decisions invalidating disorderly con-
duct statutes for vagueness.
28. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
29. See note 27 supra. Perhaps this is due to the piecemeal nature of
the offense and the catchall function of many of the statutes covering the
offense.
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1; Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL CODE]. The drafstmen of § 250.1 sug-
gest that the lack of attention may have resulted from the petty nature of
many of the offenses and the low economic and social levels of many of
the defendants. Id.
31. Such characteristics as these have lead to persistent constitutional
attacks on public disorder statutes. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Heard v.
Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 392 U.S. 646 (1968).
32. Act of June 24th, P.L. 872, § 1 et seq. (1939).
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common law crimes not specifically referred to were retained in
their common law form as indictable offenses by a savings
clause.83 Article IV of Title Eighteen of the 1939 Penal Code was
entitled "Offenses Against the Public Peace." Under Article IV,
the public disorder crimes pertinent to this discussion 4 were di-
vided into group disturbance offenses-riots, routs, unlawful as-
semblies and affrays-and individual disorderly conduct offenses.
A. Group disturbance offenses-Sec. 4401
Section 4401-Riots, routs, assemblies and affrays-provided in
part: "Whoever participates in any riot, rout, unlawful assem-
bly or affray is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding three
(3) years .... 35
Since the offenses of riot, rout, unlawful assembly and affray
were not defined by the statute itself, the Pennsylvania courts
found it necessary to resort to accepted common law definitions
to give meaning to these group disturbance crimes. 8 A recent
federal case 37 ruling on Pennsylvania law approved of this method
of statutory construction and noted that such practice had been
fully accepted by the United States Supreme Court.38
Unlawful assembly, rout and riot were often considered in-
separable. Such an understanding of these crimes, however, belies
their true nature at common law. In Commonwealth v. Duitch,3 9
the court cited the following statement with approval: "Riot,
rout and unlawful assembly are kindred offenses and the greater
includes the less; yet the several offenses are clearly distinguish-
able each from the others." 40  In actuality, riot usually included
rout and unlawful assembly; but neither of the latter two offenses
was inclusive of all three crimes.4' The three offenses were pro-
gressive and theoretically distinct steps in a violent or tumultuous
group action ascending in degrees toward the ultimate outbreak
33. Id. at § 5101.
34. Id. at §§ 4401-19.
35. Id. at § 4401.
36. Commonwealth v. Duitch, 165 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 67 A.2d 821, 822
(1949).
37. Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 392 U.S. 646
(1968).
38. See text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
39. 165 Pa. Super. 187, 67 A.2d 821 (1949).
40. Id. at 190-91, 67 A.2d at 822.
41. However, since "the greater includes the less" an individual could
not be convicted of three separate offenses at common law. All were
common law misdemeanors.
of violence from unlawful assembly to rout to riot.42
Unlawful assembly was the beginning point. Strictly speak-
ing, it occurred only where three or more persons gathered to the
disturbance of the public peace with the intention to act in an un-
lawful or riotous manner and then disbanded having left their un-
lawful purpose in the planning stages. 43 And yet, if the riotous
purpose were to have been carried out, the crime of unlawful as-
sembly still would have been committed even though no disbanding
occurred. Furthermore, it was possible for an assembly lawful in
its original purpose to become unlawful "if the group conceive[d]
an unlawful purpose and proceed[ed] to carry it out in a tumul-
tuous and riotous manner."'
44
Rout occurred where those who had unlawfully assembled
made some motion toward execution of their purpose without ac-
tually executing it. The essence of the offense was being on the
way from unlawful assembly to riot.4 5 It was not necessary that
the original intent of the unlawful assembly be carried out or that
the trip be made in a tumultuous fashion.
46
Riot was the culmination of the unlawful purpose in a violent
or tumultuous fashion. It was defined in Commonwealth v. Apri-
ceno0 7 as
the assembling together of three or more persons in a riot-
ous, tumultuous and disorderly manner, and proceeding
with a common intent and purpose to the commission of
unlawful acts which tend to alarm and terrify law-abiding
citizens, engaged in the peaceful exercise of their constitu-
tional rights and privileges.
48
42. MILLER, supra note 14, at 386. Miller offers the following hy-
pothetical to illustrate this point. A, B, and C assemble with the purpose
of planning just how they will beat X who lives a mile away. This is un-
lawful assembly at common law. Then they walk to X's house in order to
beat him. This is common law rout. Finally, they attack and beat X in the
public square in front of his house causing alarm to the onlooking public.
This is the offense of riot. Id.
43. Commonwealth v. Duitch, 165 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 67 A.2d 821, 822
(1949).
44. Commonwealth v. Zwierzelewski, 177 Pa. Super. 141, 147, 110 A.2d
757, 760 (1955). But, people have a right to gather at a proper place, in
an orderly manner, for any lawful purpose, despite illegal threats made
by others in an effort to prevent the meeting. And such a gathering does
not become an unlawful assembly by reason of the fact that they may have
cause to fear they will be violently attacked, and are so attacked. PERKINs,
supra note 16, at 405.
45. Commonwealth v. Duitch, 165 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 67 A.2d 821, 822
(1949).
46. Id.
47. 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 A. 515 (1938).
48. Id. at 161, 198 A. at 516. Another commonly used definition
stated that riot is a
tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons as-
sembled and acting with a common intent either in executing a
lawful private enterprise in a violent and turbulent manner, to
the terror of the people, or in executing an unlawful enterprise in
a violent and turbulent manner.
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It has long been established that there must have been at least three
participants acting in concert to constitute a riot.49 One man or
two men, whatever their conduct may have been, could not have
been guilty of riot, without aiders or abettors.50 The required
assembly of those three or more participants was not necessarily
assembly in the usual sense of the word; as long as the actors
were "at approximately the same place at the same time engaging
in the same kind of turbulent conduct" 1 they were assembled for
the purposes of a riot.
Nor did the law require specific proof that the actual resulting
violence resulted from the original intent of the rioters.52 "If the
results which did follow, or ones similar to them in kind, should
reasonably have been anticipated, the law presumes they intended
the ordinary and natural results .... "53 The element of intent
was inferred from the conduct;14 as a result, all those present
and participating in some way were guilty of all subsequent acts
done by the group.55 Moreover, anyone intentionally present at
the scene of a riot, who was not actually participating or assisting
in its suppression, and whose presence tended to encourage those
actually participating was "prima facie inferred to be participat-
[ing]."56 In such a situation, the usual burden of proof for the
prosecution in a criminal action was considerably lightened and
the defendant somehow had to demonstrate his actual non-inter-
ference. 57
If, in fact, the original purpose or intent to commit an unlawful
act had been accomplished, the presence or absence of any actual
personal injury or property damage was irrelevant to the charge
Commonwealth v. Zwierzelewski, 177 Pa. Super. 138, 146, 110 A.2d 757,
760 (1955).
49. See Pennsylvania v. Craig, Addeson 190 (1794).
50. Id.
51. Commonwealth v. Abney, 195 Pa. Super. 317, 322, 171 A.2d 595,
598 (1961).
52. "A rioter is one who inflames the people's minds and induces
them by violent means to accomplish an illegal object." Commonwealth
v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482, 489 (1917).
53. Id. at 489-90.
54. "Those participating in the turbulence are presumed to have
intended the violence that their acts produced." Commonwealth v. Abney,
195 Pa. Super. 317, 322, 171 A.2d 595, 598 (1961).
55. In fact, evidence of individual acts done in furtherance of the
common purpose was admissible against all participants in the riot. See
Commonwealth v. Zwierzelewski, 177 Pa. Super. 138, 152, 110 A.2d 757, 763
(1955).
56. Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482, 490 (1917).
57. I&
of riot. "Actual force or violence [was] not an indispensable ele-
ment of riot."8 It sufficed that the conditions resulting from the
participants' conduct would have naturally tended to alarm or
terrify law-abiding citizens. The in terrorem populi aspect of
the offense was satisfied by the apparent tendency of the act to in-
spire terror or alarm. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecu-
tion to show affirmatively that particular community members
were, in fact, terrorized or alarmed by the defendants' conduct.
Once the unlawful purpose was effectuated, it was also im-
material whether each individual participating in the riot had
been a party to the unlawful assembly which precipitated the
riot or had had previous knowledge of the common intent.59 In
effect, the prosecution needed only to prove the participating de-
fendant's presence and the element of riotous intent would have
been inferred. Nor was it required that the initial meeting of the
participating group was for an unlawful purpose;6 0 any assembly
lawful in its original purpose might have grown into indictable
riot if the group subsequently decided on an unlawful purpose
and carried out that purpose in a tumultuous or violent manner."
Riot 62 and inciting to riot,63 a non-statutory offense, were leg-
ally distinct offenses."4 An individual might have participated in
a riot without having incited it or have incited the riot and not
have participated in it. While inciting to riot was not necessarily
a requisite element of riot, it was often true that the two offenses
became merged within the charge of riot.6 5 Inciting to riot in-
volved the use of words or signs or any other means by which one
58. Commonwealth v. Paul, 145 Pa. Super. 548, 21 A.2d 421 (1941).
See also Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 Pa. Super. 338, 343, 209 A.2d 38, 41
(1965).
59. Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482, 489 (1917).
60. Commonwealth v. Brletic, 113 Pa. Super. 508, 173 A. 686 (1934).
61. Commonwealth v. Zwierzelewski, 177 Pa. Super. 138, 147, 110 A.2d
757,760 (1955).
62. Brief mention here of a few cases will serve to illustrate the
variety of chaotic circumstances which have given rise to successful riot
prosecutions. See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 Pa. Super. 338, 209 A.2d 38
(1965) (defendant led hundreds in a brick and bottle assault on police);
Commonwealth v. Abney, 195 Pa. Super. 317, 171 A.2d 595 (1961) (a group
of teen-aged boys attacked members of visiting high school band after a
football game, indecently assaulting the girls and beating the boys); Com-
monwealth v. Zwierzelweski, 177 Pa. Super. 138, 110 A.2d 757 (1955) (a full-
scale prison riot); Commonwealth v. Duitch, 165 Pa. Super. 187, 67 A.2d
821 (1949) (members of a striking C.I.O. chapter interrupted a meeting
between the A.F. of L. and other C.I.O. members not sympathetic with
the strike); Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 A. 515
(1938) (strikers threatened and verbally and physically abused non-strik-
ing employees).
63. Inciting to riot, as a common law offense not mentioned in the
1939 Code, was retained by the savings clause of that Code.
64. Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 A. 177 (1936);
Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 A. 515 (1938).
65. Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 A. 515 (1938).
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can be urged to action 0 calculated to provoke a riot.67 Actions
or movements were found to be as effective and, therefore, as pun-
ishable for this purpose as the use of inflammatory language.6 8
Also required was either the specific intent to provoke a riot or a
reckless or willful disregard of the probable riotous results of one's
conduct or words.6 9
The remaining statutory crime mentioned and left unde-
fined was affray. The leading case on this offense, Commonwealth
v. Merrick,70 indicated that "if a sudden disturbance arises among
persons meeting together for an innocent purpose, they will be
guilty of mere affray."71  Mention of this offense is infrequent
in the Pennsylvania case law on public disorder crimes and it seems
that it was intended to cover situations involving minor public
fights and scuffles in public places.7 2 It was not required that
the fight actually cause any public alarm. As long as it occurred in
a public place, the in terrorem populi aspect of the offense was pre-
sumed and it was unimportant whether anyone besides the parti-
cipants was present."
B. Disorderly conduct offenses-Section 4406
Section 4406 of the Pennsylvania Penal Code of 1939 states:
Whoever wilfully makes or causes to be made any loud,
boisterous and unseemly noise or disturbance to the an-
noyance of the peaceable residents nearby, or near to any
public highway, road, street, lane, alley, park, square or
common, whereby the public peace is broken or disturbed
or the traveling public annoyed is guilty of the offense of
disorderly conduct. . . .74
Contrary to the more general language of Section 4401, which
left the definition of offenses to the common law, on first reading
66. Id. at 160, 198 A. at 517.
67. For a colorful example of a union organizer's speech which in-
cited a riot see Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482, 485-86
(1917).
68. Commonwealth v. Albert, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695 (1951).
69. Commonwealth v. Egan, 113 Pa. Super. 375, 173 A. 764 (1934).
In Egan, there was sufficient evidence to support an inciting to riot con-
viction. See Commonwealth v. Spartaco, 104 Pa. Super. 1, 158 A. 623
(1932).
70. 65 Pa. Super. 482 (1917).
71. Id. at 489.
72. See 2A C.J.S. Affray §§ 1-20 (1972).
73. PERnixs, supra note 16, at 491.
74. Act of June 24th, P.L. 872, § 406 (1939). Section 4407 made dis-
orderly conduct on railway cars, passenger stations or platforms, bus termi-
nals and at picnic grounds a separate summary offense. Act of June 24th,
P.L. 872, § 4407.
the words of Section 4406 appear to be quite specific. Specificity
is especially important with disorderly conduct since it was an
entirely a statutory offense' 5 and all the elements of the offense as
proscribed by the statute must have been present for a conviction.
Thus, the exactness with which these requisite elements are
drawn in the statutory language is crucial to the effective and
proper functioning of the enforcing police officer and the courts
as well as for the understanding of the potential offender. Many
disorderly conduct statutes have been subjected to successful con-
stitutional attack76  on void-for-vagueness7 7  or overbreadth78
grounds.
Generally, disorderly conduct offenses involved any conduct
disruptive of the public peace which fell short of constituting
breach of the peace or one of the other distinct disorder of-
fenses at common law. The Pennsylvania definition of the offense
under Section 4406 was worded somewhat more carefully.7 9 In
Commonwealth v. Greene,80 the court stated that the "cardinal
feature of disorderly conduct is public unruliness which can or
does lead to tumult and disorder.""' While these general words
seem to offer little help in pinpointing the basic elements of the of-
fense, the court did go on to consider disorderly conduct in some
detail.
In Greene, the defendant owned and operated an oval race
track on which were held Go-Kart races for children. The cars
used were small, four-wheeled go-karts propelled by small gaso-
line engines. The court held that such activity, despite the ap-
parent loud and boisterous noise, did not constitute disorderly con-
duct. The operation of a legal business in an orderly manner can-
not constitute the crime of disorderly conduct.8 2 For noise to have
been disorderly, it must have been unseemly as well as loud and
boisterous. The noise from the go-karts was admittedly loud and
boisterous, but the court decided that it could not be considered
unseemly. Unseemly meant "not fitting or proper in respect to the
conventional standards of organized society or a legally constituted
75. Municipalities also have jurisdiction to pass disorderly conduct
ordinances. However, they must adhere to the state statute.
76. See note 27 supra.
77. For a discussion of this doctrine see notes 135-67 and accompany-
ing text infra.
78. Id.
79. See Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 392 U.S.
646 (1968) (where the court held that this disorderly conduct provision
was specific enough to withstand a void for vagueness attack); text ac-
companying notes 96-100 infra.
80. 410 Pa. 111, 189 A.2d 141 (1963).
81. Id. at 115, 189 A.2d at 143. The court depicted the classic exam-
ple of disorderly conduct as engaging in clamor and outcry in the public
streets in a manner which arouses attention and causes people to draw to-




community."8' 3 The court referred to the facts of Commonwealth
ex rel. Jenkins v. Costello8 4 as an example of the unseemly nature
of disorderly conduct.8 5 There the defendant threatened to punch
another individual in the nose and called him vile names in a
loud voice which served to attract the attention of persons nearby.
The court said that in Pennsylvania the offense embraced
"activity which disturbs the peace and dignity of the commun-
ity. '8 6 The important aspect of the conduct was that it disturbed
the public because of its loudness, boisterousness and unseemli-
ness. Making loud noises in public, in and of itself, did not consti-
tute disorderly conduct. The court intimated that the proper
remedy here might well have been an injunction to abate a nuisance
rather than a criminal prosecution, 7 when asserting that "dis-
orderly conduct [was] not intended as a catchall for every act
which annoys or disturbs people; it is not to be used as a dragnet
for all the irritations which breed in the ferment of the com-
munity."8 8
For the Pennsylvania courts, the attempt to define disorderly
conduct was not easy.8 9 In a concurring opinion in Greene, Jus-
tice Cohen suggested that such difficulty was due to the vague and
uncertain language of Section 4406.90 Such problems arise from
the nature of the activity intended to be enjoined by the statute.
The conduct sought to be regulated is described, all too often,
simply as that which annoys or disturbs the community. Such
activity is not easily subjected to enduring specific definitions; as
83. Id. at 113, 189 A.2d at 143.
84. 141 Pa. Surer. 183, 14 A.2d 567 (1940).
85. See also Commonwealth v. Palms, 141 Pa. Super. 430, 15 A.2d 481
(1940); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 95 Pa. Super. 382 (1928).
86. 410 Pa. 11, 115, 189 A.2d 141, 143 (1963). The court gave the ex-
amples of a drunk running through town, fighting in a public place and
exploding firecrackers at night in the public square. Id. at 116, 189 A.2d
at 144.
87. Id. at 120, 189 A.2d at 147.
88. Id. at 117, 189 A.2d at 145.
89. For conduct which has been affirmed or rejected as disorderly
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sgrobati, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 173 (C.P. Phila.
1970) (no, where defendant wore the U.S. flag to his draft induction physi-
cal); Commonwealth v. Wysocki, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 334 (C.P. Montour 1956)
(yes, where defendant threw firecrackers onto a main highway); Com-
monwealth v. Conlin, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 591 (C.P. Luzerne 1954) (no, where
high powered rifles and shotguns were fired near residential property);
Commonwealth ex rel. Chief, Bureau of Charities and Correction, 48 Pa.
D. & C.2d 89 (C.P. Phila. 1943) (no, where impudent and indecent con-
duct did not involve a public disturbance); Commonwealth v. Brewer,
19 Pa. D. & C. 55 (C.P. Alleg. 1932) (no, where heated discussion follow-
ing a denial of a permit for a campus anti-war demonstration was not
accompanied by any physical violence).
90. 410 Pa. 111, 121, 189 A.2d 141, 147 (1963).
such, it has not been restricted under a limited criminal categoriza-
tion. Thus, disorderly conduct in Pennsylvania was a catchall of-
fense by the words of its own definition in spite of the protestations
of the majority opinion in Greene.9 1
C. Heard v. Rizzo-The final say on Sections 4401 and 4406
In Heard v. Rizzo, 92 plaintiffs sought a determination that the
riot and disorderly conduct provisions, among others, of the Penn-
sylvania Penal Code were unconstitutional per se and had been un-
constitutionally applied by the Philadelphia police in clearing the
streets of a mob. Plaintiffs based their attack on the alleged
vagueness of the statutory language,9 3 pointing out that Section
4401 listed, but failed to define, the offenses of riot, rout, unlawful
assembly and affray. The court answered by indicating that the of-
fenses were fully and adequately defined at common law. Fur-
thermore, the practice of referring to the accepted common law
meanings of offenses left undefined by a statute "not only imparts
to these terms an acceptable precision [but] it is a method of sta-
tutory construction that has been fully accepted by the United
States Supreme Court. '9 4 The court, in upholding the statute
against the void-for-vagueness attack, noted the unlikelihood that
these public disorder offenses would or could be given "any defi-
nition by any Pennsylvania court other than these common law
definitions." 95
Plaintiffs suffered a similar setback with their vagueness at-
tack on Section 4406.96 The court held that the Pennsylvania
courts had defined the requisite elements of disorderly conduct
in sufficiently definite terms and, as required by the Pennsylvania
Statutory Construction Act,9? had strictly construed the statute.
Referring with approval to the Greene definition of unseemly,98
the court found the term to be analogous to the accepted and com-
monly used legal phrase "unreasonable" and at least as clear in
meaning.9 9 The court noted that the other required elements of
loudness and boisterousness were equally as certain of definition'"0
and rejected plaintiffs' constitutional argument.
91. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
92. 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 392 U.S. 646 (1968).
93. "Where a conviction is 'based on a common law concept of the
most general and undefined nature' there is left to the 'executive and judi-
cial branches too wide a discretion in its application.'" Id. at 743, quoting
from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
94. Id. at 740.
95. Id.
96. The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the common law
offenses of inciting to riot and breach of the peace, as retained under the
savings clause of the 1939 Penal Code, were invalid due to vagueness.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558(1) (1937).
98. See text accompanying note 83 supra.




Thus, the public disorder offenses of the 1939 Penal Code and
their definitional ties to the common law were upheld, and the law
on public disorder offenses seemed settled. However, such consti-
tutional approval hardly means that Pennsylvania's statutory
treatment of these crimes was unobjectionable. The statutes were
able to withstand constitutional attack and the various legal
definitions were simple enough to verbalize. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that such judicial clarity enabled, lay persons, on either side
of the law, to measure their conduct accordingly. The precision
of language required of and hoped for in criminal statutes was
not present. Constitutionality is not the final test of a statute.
If it is unclear or improperly used it must be redrafted. With the
new Crimes Code, the attempt has been made to bring a much
needed specificity to the statutory language. There has also been
an effort to fashion a systematic approach, and in view of the prior
law, progress has been made.
IV. PUBLIC DISORDER OFFENSES UNDER THE NEW CRmn CoDE
The public disorder provisions '0 1 of the new Crimes Code em-
body a number of significant changes in the substantive law of
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5501 (Supp. 1973) provides:
A person is guilty of riot, a felony of the third degree, if he
participates with two or more others in a course of disorderly con-
duct:
(1) with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a
felony or misdemeanor;
(2) with intent to prevent or coerce official action; or
(3) when the actor or any other participant to the knowledge
of the actor uses or plans to use a firearm or other deadly
weapon.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5502 (Supp. 1973) provides:
Where three or more persons are participating in a course of
disorderly conduct which causes or may be reasonably expected to
cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, a peace officer or other public servant engaged in executing
or enforcing the law may order the participants and others in the
immediate vicinity to disperse. A person who refuses or know-
ingly fails to obey such an order commits a misdemeanor of the
second degree.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5503 (Supp. 1973) provides in part:
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of disorderly con-
duct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or
tumultuous behavior;
(2) makes unreasonable noise;
(3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture;
or
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offense condition
by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
(b) Grading.-An offense under this section is a misde-
meanor of the third degree if the intent of the actor is to cause
Pennsylvania. In examining these changes, this section will indi-
cate briefly what the specific changes are and then discuss the ex-
tent to which they will serve to correct the inadequacies of prior
law.
In the new Code, the section covering riot'0 2 replaces the sec-
tion of the previous Penal Code which encompassed riots, routs,
unlawful assemblies and affrays.10o  Under prior law, the statute
attempted no definition of the listed offenses and the courts resorted
to the common law to give them meaning. 0 4 In the new section,
the offense is specifically defined by restricting it to participation
in a course of disorderly conduct in specified circumstances.0 5 In
addition, intent or knowledge is now a requisite element in those
specified circumstances. 0 6 Finally, riot has become a felony of
the third degree' 07 with a maximum potential imprisonment of
seven years.10 8
Similarly, disorderly conduct is defined with more exactness
under the new Code."°9 The "loud, boisterous and unseemly noise
or disturbance"' 10 of the past definition has been subjected to
specific delineation resulting in four explicit categories of disor-
derly conduct rather than one general definition. In so doing,
the legislature has streamlined and particularized the offense,
simultaneously extending it to conduct not before covered.1 1' For
each of the four, intent or reckless disregard is now the prerequisite
mental state of the actor."l 2 Furthermore, the offense is divided
into two categories according to the nature of the actor's intent.
In this regard, disorderly conduct can be either a third degree mis-
demeanor, punishable by a maximum imprisonment of one year,'1 3
or a summary offense, punishable by a maximum of ninety days
imprisonment."X4
The new Crimes Code has added an entirely new offense: a
misdemeanor of the second degree is committed by refusing or
knowingly failing to obey a peace officer's properly given order
to disperse where "three of more persons are participating in a
course of disorderly conduct which causes or may be reasonably
substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in dis-
orderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist.
Otherwise disorderly conduct is a summary offense.
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5501 (Supp. 1973).
103. Act of June 24th, P.L. 872, § 401 (1939).
104. See text accompanying notes 35-73 supra.
105. See note 101 supra.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104(b) (4) (Supp. 1973).
109. See note 101 supra.
110. Act of June 24th, P.L. 872, § 406 (1939).
111. See note 101 supra.
112. Id.
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104(b) (8) (Supp. 1973).
114. Id. at § 104(c).
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expected to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, an-
noyance or alarm.""-3
It is also important to note that, contrary to the 1939 Penal
Code 1 " common law crimes not specified in the Code are abol-
ished.'1 7 This means that inciting to riot, breach of the peace,
rout and unlawful assembly, as such, are no longer criminal of-
fenses in Pennsylvania."" However, the substance of those of-
fenses, as defined under prior law,"19 should be kept in mind when
observing the courts as they venture into the new ground of de-
ciding what conduct is covered by the new public disorder provi-
ions.
Before analyzing the effect of these changes, it is well to in-
spect the preliminary statement of purpose for the entire Code.
The goals set forth therein reflect the types and direction of the
changes wrought by the new statutory language of Chapter 55.
Section 104(2) indicates the emphasis of the definitions of crimes
in the Code on the mental state or intent of the actor. 120 Section
104(4) expresses legislative concern with observing the due pro-
cess requirement of fair notice as to the specific conduct which
constitutes an offense.121 And section 104(5) emphasizes the im-
portance of making rational differentiations among the offenses ac-
cording to their inherent gravity and of reflecting this rationality
in the differentiation of treatment of the various classes of of-
fenders.
122
These general statutory aims have been closely adhered to in
the public disorder provisions. 2 3  For example, the old common
law definitions employed to give meaning to the offenses of riot,
rout, unlawful assembly and affray were overlapping, overly gen-
eral and, despite the Heard decision, subject to objection on those
115. See note 101 supra.
116. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 107(b) (Supp. 1973).
118. See notes 35-73 and accompanying text supra.
119. Id.
120. "To safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as
criminal." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104(2) (Supp. 1973).
121. "To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to
constitute an offense, and of the sentences that may be imposed on con-
viction of an offense." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104(4) (Supp. 1973).
122. "To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses, and to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just in-
dividualization in their treatment." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104(5)
(Supp. 1973).
123. Chapter 55 is very similar to § 250.1 of the Model Penal Code.
The stated purposes of that section are closely in line with the general
aims of the new Code in Pennsylvania. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra
note 30.
grounds. There was a patent failure to differentiate between
mere public annoyance and true anti-social conduct. In contrast,
the new definition of riot is considerably clarified. The specific
instances in which a course of disorderly conduct becomes a indi-
catable riot are set forth inclusively and in detail. Although some
definitional difficulty may remain with the public annoyance-
anti-social conduct distinction, at least this inclusive detail pro-
vides the enforcing officer, the courts and the public with guide-
lines for the proper conduct suited to each of their respective roles
in a public disorder situation. The catchall language has disap-
peared. Such concern with exactness goes a long way in avoiding
the type of constitutional attack 124 to which public disorder statutes
are so often subjected. This careful definition of offenses is an im-
portant safeguard for individual liberties.
1 25
The heavy emphasis of the new statutory language on the in-
tent or knowledge of the actor rightfully supplants the former
focus on the effects of the actor's conduct on others, since one
of the basic postulates of the criminal law is to base punishment
on the unlawful intent or mens rea of the actor.126  A mentally
competent individual has a choice between acting lawfully or un-
lawfully in a given situation and, if he wilfully chooses the un-
lawful course of action, he is punished. It is inconsistent with
this theory to punish solely for the effect which one's lawful con-
duct has on others. Under the generally imprecise language of
the prior laws, this was entirely possible.127 For example, a speak-
er, who had no intention to disrupt, could have been held crimi-
nally liable for the provocation of unruly behavior in those hos-
tile to his public statements. This is no longer true under the
new Code.1 28  Punishable offenses in this area are now limited
to that unlawful behavior which in and of itself disturbs the pub-
lic order and tranquility.
129
In addition, there appears in the new Code a rational grada-
tion of the offenses which was wholly absent from the 1939 Penal
Code. To replace the sometimes imponderable definitions of the
past law, the new Code offers a sensible separation of violent
group behavior, which is inherently more dangerous, from the less
serious offenses of individual disorderliness. Incumbent upon the
124. See, e.g., Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.), ajf'd,
392 U.S. 646 (1968); Commonwealth v. Duitch, 165 Pa. Super. 187, 67 A.2d
821 (1949).
125. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, at 3. See also Coates v.
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
126. See Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
127. Primary emphasis was put on annoyance to nearby residents or
the disruption of public order and tranquility with little or no consideration
of the actor's intent.
128. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5507 (Supp. 1973).
129. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, at 6-9. See generally, Note,
Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of a Hostile Audience, 49
COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1949).
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success of any such statutory scheme is the need for a correspond-
ing graduated scale of punishment. The new Code sections pro-
vide for this by punishing the potentially most dangerous offense
of group violence most heavily and the least dangerous act of
individual unruliness most lightly. It is fair as well as rational
to "provide aggravated penalties for disorderly conduct where the
number of participants makes the behavior especially alarming" 130
to the community.
Thus, the new Code provides for a graduated pattern of of-
fenses and punishments according to the seriousness of the acts
and the number of participants involved. Each offense is
grounded on the intent of the individual actor. Once the intent
is established the punishemnt is made commensurate with the
threat to the community as demonstrated by the nature of the act
or the number of people involved. The individual act of dis-
orderly conduct is subjected to relatively light penalties upon con-
viction.' 31 Where three or more individuals participating in
disorderly conduct fail to disperse upon a reasonably given official
order, their potential penalty is greater.13 2 And when the disor-
derly conduct of three or more individuals acting in concert reaches
the level of the four specific instances designated as riot, the pen-
alty is most severe.
13
Another advantage of the new Code is its unified, inclusive
treatment of public disorder offenses. They are spelled out in
detail and presented cohesively in succeeding sections of the sta-
tute. Definitions for all the public disorder offenses can be ascer-
tained from the statute rather than by the involved and time-con-
suming reference to the common law which was necessary under
prior law. Furthermore, an overview of the legislative intent in
this area of law can be gained from a reading of the statutory
provisions. Again, this obviates reference to extra-statutory sources
for information which should be present in the statute itself.
However, the new Code is not entirely problem free. Of
course, much of the success or failure of the public disorder pro-
visions in effectuating the overall aims of the entire Crimes Code
will depend upon the tack which courts take in interpreting the
statutes. A prospective look at these statutes necessarily includes
consideration of the inevitable first amendment problems. Con-
130. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, at 21.
131. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 18, § 5503 (Supp. 1973).
132. Id. at § 5502.
133. Id. at § 5501.
stitutional questions are certain to arise with almost any statute
which attempts to balance a valid societal interest with a con-
flicting exercise of individual rights; the public disorder sections
of the new Crimes Code are no exception. These constitutional
problems may appear in the form of an attack on the wording of
the statute itself or as an attack on the manner in which the statu-
tory language is being applied by the courts and the police. De-
spite the obvious improvements brought about by the new Code,
the courts, when interpreting these statutes which attempt to pre-
serve the societal interest in law and order, must still act with
cautious and measured deliberation in order to avoid sacrificing
the "breathing space"'134 required for the rightful exercise of first
amendment freedoms.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE PUBLIC
DISOIDER PROVISIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S
NEW CRIMES CODE
The potential conflict between a public disorder statute and
the freedoms of speech and assembly is clear; and therefore any
legislation which directly or indirectly affects the exercise of basic
first amendment freedoms will receive close judicial scrutiny.
3 5
Legal controls in the form of public disorder statutes are designed
to preserve public peace and order and to insure safety and con-
venience for the citizenry in its use of public places; yet the right
of individual members of society to freely speak and assemble in
order to air their views is recognized as a basic freedom in our
constitutional framework. In striking a balance between these
competing interests in the use of public places, a legislature is, in
effect, fashioning its individualized conception of ordered liber-
ty.1.q6
Striking the balance is not a simple task. "A function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute."'
7
The function of a public disorder statute is to prevent or punish
disruptive public conduct. In this era where organized public
demonstration has become well-established as a means of voicing
one's grievances, these two functions often seem irreconcilable.
Prior cases offer little in the way of definitive definitional guid-
ance to legislators faced with the task of striking the balance with
statutory language. Each new case with a new set of facts only pro-
vides another general statement to be considered on the respective
134. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "[Sltandards of permis-
sible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression . . . be-
cause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive ...
government may regulate in this area only with narrow specificity." Id.
at 432.
135. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
136. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 115 (1960).
137. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
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weight to be given to each competing interest.1 38 Mere reference
to this series of general pronouncements is of limited value to leg-
islative draftsmen charged with the duty of writing the specific
details of public disorder provisions.
The nature of the conduct involved and the inherent limita-
tions of language itself combine to further complicate this task.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter succinctly posed the dilemma as "[h]ow
to escape, on the one hand, having a law rendered futile because
no standard is afforded by which conduct is to be judged, and on
the other, a law so particularized as to defeat itself through the
opportunity it affords for evasion."'1 39 The riot and disorderly
conduct provisions of the new Pennsylvania Crimes Code are aimed
at punishing speech or conduct which has already disrupted the
public peace. 140  The general drafting dilemma reflects the
nature of the constitutional problems which are likely to arise with
the new Code provisions.
A. Need for precise statutory language: vagueness and over-
breadth
A basic due process notion of fairness 4' requires a penal stat-
ute to adequately inform the public of the conduct it proscribes
or requires.142 This element of notice is especially crucial in the
area of public disorders where the statutes and common law defi-
nitions are so often overly general. 43 Criminal statutes, of neces-
sity, must be more precise than noncriminal statutes; 14 4 due pro-
cess fairness demands explicit wording where the potential pen-
alties are most severe. No person "may be required at peril of life,
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal stat-
utes." 45 The test is whether men of common intelligence must
guess as to the meaning of the statutory language or differ as to
138. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
139. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 501, 533 (1948) (dissenting opin-
ion).
140. For a tri-partite categorization of the aims of disorder statutes see
EMTERSON, HABER & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 519 (3d ed. 1967).
141. See Note, Due Process Requirement of Definiteness in Statutes,
62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948).
142. See MeBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); Chester v.
Elam, 408 Pa. 350, 356 (1962).
143. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
144. This is because "it would be unthinkable to convict a man for
violating a law he could not understand." Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 137 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
145. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
its application.146 This test buttresses the common law practice
of construing criminal statutes strictly in order to afford as much
protection as possible to the defendant. 1
47
The standard of textual precision required of a criminal stat-
ute is not impossible to attain;148 yet, any statute which fails to
satisfy the test is constitutionally infirm. When the criminal ac-
tivity sought to be prevented directly involves or indirectly af-
fects first amendment freedoms, it will not be assumed that
in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be re-
solved in favor of adequate protection for First Amendment
rights. Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free ex-
pression are suspect. 149
Thus, legislatures must be particularly careful to draft with nar-
row specificity so as to insure the breathing speace first amend-
ment rights need to survive."05
The primary grounds for constitutional attack on imprecisely
drawn criminal statutes are vagueness 18 1 and overbreadth. 15 The
void-for-vagueness doctrine involves the aforementioned principle
of due process fairness in notifying the public what is intended to
be covered by the statute.153 Public disorder statutes are sub-
ject to first amendment attack under two distinct void-for-vague-
ness theories.8 4 If the statutory language itself fails to give fair
notice to those persons potentially subject to it, it is vulnerable to
challenge as being void on its face.155 If the statute is being arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily enforced or is capable of such enforce-
ment, it may be attacked as unconstitutional as applied. This
latter approach has met with success in recent civil rights cases. 5 6
Vagueness in the area of first amendment rights is an elusive
concept. A statute may appear on its face to be precise enough
and subject to fair administration;'157 but, if it is easily adaptable
146. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
147. See Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1941).
148. United States v. Petrillo. 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
149. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
150. Id. at 432.
151. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
152. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 844 (1970).
153. See notes 141-47 and accompanying text supra.
154. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Winters v. New York,
335 U.S. 507 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Heard v.
Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 392 U.S. 646 (1968).
155. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
156. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "It is enough that
a vague and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against un-
popular causes. In such circumstances, a statute ... may easily become a
weapon of oppression, however evenhanded its terms may appear." Id.
at 435-36.
157. See note 155 and accompanying text supra.
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to bad faith administration by police or magistrates in violation
of first amendment rights then it should be ruled unconstitu-
tional. 158 The potential danger involved is that a state may be
inhibitorily regulating beyond its constitutional prerogative "be-
cause persons at the fringes of amenability to regulation will
rather obey than run the risk of erroneous constitutional judg-
ment."' 5 8  For instance, in a recent civil rights case, the Sup-
reme Court indicated than an imprecisely drawn statute which
impinges upon the lawful exercise of the freedoms of speech and
assembly acts as a weapon of oppression.8 0 "Its mere existence
could well freeze out of existence all such activity on behalf of
the civil rights of Negro citizens."'' 1 This does not mean that leg-
islatures are unable to allow any discretion in the enforcement of
a penal statute. The Supreme Court does not require impossible
standards.16 2 However, the Court does require that such statutes
meet the tests of sufficient notice and constitutionally proper ap-
plication.
Conceptually, an attack on a statute under the vagueness test
for potentially arbitrary enforcement closely resembles an attack
based on the overbreadth doctrine. 63 There is one distinguishing
factor. The vagueness attack is usually directed at statutes which
directly affect the first amendment freedoms through the conduct
proscribed. The overbreadth attack more often focuses on the in-
validation of statutes which indirectly affect first amendment safe-
guards. These ostensibly legitimate statutes are vulnerable on the
basis of the chilling effect'6 4 which they may have on preferred
first amendment freedoms.' 5
These then, are the three available avenues of constitutional
attack 6 on public disorder statutes which directly or indirectly
158. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting
opinion); P. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L.
REv. 533, 539 (1951).
159. See Note, supra note 151, at 80.
160. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1953).
161. Id.
162. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
163. Cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). A New York statute
was struck down as overly broad even though it was specifically deter-
mined not to be vague in the due process notice sense. Id. at 249-50.
164. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 379 (1965).
165. A statute is void for overbreadth because "a governmental pur-
pose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regu-
lation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1963).
166. See Note, Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct Laws: Void
for Vagueness?, 12 How. L.J. 318, 323-26 (1966).
affect the freedoms of speech and assembly. The ultimate ra-
tionale for all three is the preferred status given these first amend-
ment freedoms by the courts.'
6 7
B. First amendment rights involved: speech and assembly
The first amendment protects the rights of individuals to
speak freely and peaceably assemble.6 8 The right of assembly
is an independent right "cognate to those of free speech and free
press and is equally as fundamental.' '169 Since the usual purpose
of assembly in public places is to deliver or listen to speeches or
to demonstrate a point of view, the right of assembly is necessarily
intertwined with the right of free speech in the public disorder
area.170 A literal reading of the first amendment might suggest
that it is simply unconstitutional for any criminal statute to at-
tempt to punish any kind of verbal communication or any peace-
ful assembly. However, this is not the case. Those rights are
fundamental, but not absolute at all times and under any circum-
stances. "The rights of free speech and assembly . . . still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address
a group at any public place at any time."''
One particular form of communication, not protected by the
first amendment, includes obscene, profane, libelous or fighting
word utterances which by their nature tend to incite breaches of
the public peace. 172 The usual requirement for proscribing speech
is the demonstration of a clear and present danger resulting from
the speech objected to.1 73 This requirement is abrogated, how-
ever, for the types of communication listed above since they are
deemed so non-expressive and unessential to the exposition of
ideas.17 4 Such expletives are considered to be of minimal social
value in contrast with the overriding public interest in maintaining
order.
Other distinctions made according to the nature of the expres-
sive activity and the place of its occurence leave certain modes
of expression outside the scope of first amendment protection.
One such differentiation is made between speech pure and speech
167. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring opinion).
168. See note 5 supra.
169. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1936).
170. See ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND AssOCIATION (1961);
Note, Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United
States, 47 YALE L.J. 404 (1938).
171. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). See Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 373 (1927).
172. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
173. For the classic statement of the clear and present danger test see
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
174. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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plus.175 Pure speech receives heavy protection under the judi-
cially-fashioned clear and present danger test. However, speech
related activity in the form of picketing, demonstration or other
symbolic conduct, while protected, does not receive the same extent
of favorable treatment from the courts. The fact that pure speech
is intertwined with such conduct is not important. 17 6 When pure
speech and non-speech elements are combined, a state in its
legitimate regulation of the non-speech portion can successfuly de-
fend "incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'
17
The preferred treatment of pure speech over symbollic expressive
conduct would seem to remain even when the conduct actually
is an expression of ideas and beliefs. 78 A legislature may not
wholly proscribe speech-related conduct; but, controls unavailable
as to pure speech may be used provided that they are reasonable,
narrowly drawn and non-discriminating among groups of citi-
znes.' 79 Such statutes must avoid directly regulating the actual
pure speech content which may be intermingled with the less pro-
tected speech-related conduct. The power to control excesses of
conduct must not be used to suppress the preferred constitutional
right itself.
The other basic distinction relates to the place in which the
activity occurs. Whether the speech will be protected, may de-
pend on the court's view of what the predominant intended use
of the place in question is. At some indefinite point, the use of
a public place to air grievances through symbolic conduct is clearly
overridden by another public use intended for the area. The
central issue becomes whether a particular public place is to be
used primarily as a true public forum.180 Some public places ap-
175. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 S. CT. REv. 1, 22.
176. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968).
177. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The O'Brien
decision sets out a lengthy test for this proposition. Id.
178. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Id. at 578
(Black, J., concurring opinion); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 162
(Black, J., dissenting opinion); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 501-02 (1949). The line drawn between pure speech and speech-
related conduct is not always a clear one. Compare United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a draft card, even though done
solely to express an idea, was not protected as speech) with Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (breach of the peace conviction for walking
through a courthouse wearing a jacket on which were written obscene
words reversed).
179. This may be done in the form of regulating the time and place of
speech-related conduct. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
(place); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (place); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
180. Compare Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 451 (1939) (traditional use of
pear to be obvious centers for protest. But, as Justice Douglas has
said, these places may be
so clearly committed to other purposes that their use for
the airing of grievances is anomalous. There may be
some instances in which assembly and petitions for redress
of grievances are not consistent with other necessary pur-
poses of public property.
181
Thus, a jailhouse,182 a courthouse' and legislative chambers'
84
are public places where speech-related conduct has been prohibited
as inappropriate to the primary intended use of the areas. And
yet, such varied sites as a state capitol grounds, 8 5 a major urban
bus terminal'" and the mall of a privately owned shopping cen-
ter8 T have been approved as public forums for speech-related con-
duct. The rational for the latter categorization is that those pub-
lic places sufficiently resemble parks and streets which are "so
historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment
rights that access to them for the purposes of exercising such
rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely."' 88
Thus, society's interest in maintaining order is more likely
to prevail over freedom of expression the more the nature of the
expression tends away from pure speech and the situs of the ex-
pression tends toward private, or restricted public, usage. Pure
speech, however, retains its preferred status. It is crucial to main-
tain these distinctions when examining a public disorder statute
which directly or indirectly affects the airing of views through
speech and assembly. Even where the societal interest in public
order balances most favorably against individual expression, the
statute effectuating that interest still must be precise and narrow
in order to withstand vagueness or overbreadth attacks. Even
as draftsmen's awareness of the need for specificity in the public
disorder area becomes more acute, there remains the problem of
seemingly valid statutory language which, in practice, lends itself
to arbitrary enforcement by arresting officers to the obvious det-
riment of the rights of free speech and assembly. 8 9
parks and streets as public forums) with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941) (public forum use subject to accommodation).
181. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
182. Id.
183. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
184. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting
opinion, dictum).
185. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
186. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1969).
187. Amalgamated Food Employees' Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
188. Id. at 313.
189. See, e,g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (convictions of




C. Dangers of too much police discretion
The actual violation of individual rights which occurs as the
result of a broadly or vaguely worded criminal statute takes place
at the enforcement, not the drafting, level. The potential for sel-
ective enforcement is great. While it can happen with any criminal
statute,190 it is particularly endemic to the disorder statutes. To
give the enforcing officer too much discretion is "to place those
who assert First Amendment rights at his mercy. It gives him the
awesome power to decide whose ideas may be expressed and who
shall be denied a place to air their claims and petition their gov-
ernment."'19  In effect, each policeman becomes a legislator. Un-
der a vague statute, it is his personal discretion which determines
what conduct is disorderly or when a demonstration has become
threatening to the public peace. But, it is not the function of a
policeman to adjudicate and punish. 92 His task is enforcement;
he is supposed to arrest and take offenders into custody and no
more. With specific statutory definitions of crimes, the police
and the courts would have the necessary guidance to discern illegal
conduct without resorting to their own notions of right and wrong.
Legislative failure to define crimes specifically bodes ill for
the rights of free speech and assembly under public disorder sta-
tutes. The exercise of discretion is perhaps the policeman's most
difficult problem.9 3 He becomes the interpreter of the law. With-
out specific statutory language defining the scope of his activity,
the policeman has no choice but to substitute his own value judg-
ments when deciding what conduct is criminal. Certainly, con-
duct should be judged on the basis of law rather than on what of-
fends a particular police officer. Otherwise, in the public disorder
area, first amendment rights are likely to be improperly subor-
dinated to the preservation of order.194
This danger inheres in both the individual disorderly conduct
190. "A criminal code, in practice, is not a set of specific instructions
to policemen but more or less a rough map of the territory in which
policemen work. How an individual policeman moves around that territory
depends largely on his personal discretion." CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra
note 10, at 10.
191. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting
opinion).
192. J. SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST, STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 249 (1968) [here-
inafter as SKOLNICK].
193. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 10, at 103.
194. "Nonconformity comes to be viewed with nearly as much sus-
picion as actual law violation; correspondingly, the police value the famil-
iar, the ordinary, the status quo .... " SKOLNICK at 261.
arrest and mass arrests during a group demonstration. Without
statutory guidance, a policeman's notion of the annoyance quo-
tient of an individual's conduct may stem from the individual's
age, race or appearance rather than his conduct. 195 Moreover,
when group activity involves individuals or points of view highly
offensive to a policeman personally, it is difficult for him to per-
sist in his responsibility to protect the exercise of constitutional
freedoms. 196 This is not to say that the police are entirely to
blame. "In protest situations, police are in the public eye and fre-
quently find themselves in the impossible position of acting as
substitutes for necessary political and social reform. '197 It is, af-
ter all, the affirmative duty of the legislature to spell out as pre-
cisely as possible that activity which is included or excluded by
the criminal statute.
9 8
Furthermore, in the exercise of their discretion, police serve
as the public's most frequent contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem. What the policeman does day-to-day "is often perceived as
what the law is."'19 Crime looks altogether different on the street
than it does from the perspective of a legislative chamber. 20 0 And
when, without policy guidance from the legislature, the policeman
makes his "low-visibility" 20 ' decision, it is often treated as legally
conclusive by the court as well as by the general public.202 Thus,
as one municipal court judge has warned, "[i]f the law is to be
respected, it must rely on standards readily discernible and not
left to the personal feelings of the police.
'20 3
These factors point to the basic need for specificity in a crimi-
nal statute. Without it, legislative intent as to particular offenses
is supplanted by police discretion and the attendant probability
of arbitrary enforcement. Such a statute would be particularly
vulnerable to attack on void-for-vagueness grounds.
20 4
195. See case cited note 189 supra. "Police view students, the anti-
war protestors and blacks as a danger to our political system, and racial
prejudice pervades police attitudes and actions." SKOLNICK at 289.
196. This is especially true in the context of demonstrations which
advocate social change. For an analysis of what this means in terms of the
need for narrowly drawn riot statutes see B. Feld, Police Violence and
Protest, 55 MINN. L. REV. 731 (1971).
197. SKOLNICK at 194.
198. Nonetheless, it remains true that "the manner in which police
respond to demonstrations will determine, in large measure, whether
violence will break out." REPORT Or THE TASK FORCE ON POLICE OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, The Police, 24-5 (1968).
199. SKOLNICK at 269.
200. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 10, at 10.
201. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Proc-
ess: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE
L.J. 543 (1960).
202. See text accompanying notes 190-93 supra.
203. Watts, J., Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society,
9 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 349, 354 (1967).
204. See § IV, B. supra.
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D. Constitutional objections to the new Pennsylvania disorder
provisions
Pennsylvania's new public disorder statutes closely adhere to
the guidelines set forth in Article 250 of the Model Penal Code.20 5
An express purpose of that Article is to "safeguard civil liberty
by careful definition of offenses."20 6 This conscious effort to fairly
balance constitutional freedoms with public order is a marked im-
provement over the approach of the previous statutes. However,
constitutional attacks seem inevitable.
There is only a limited likelihood of successful attack on the
new riot and disorderly statutes2 7 on the grounds of their being
vague on the face. On the whole, an obvious effort has been
made to be as specific as possible, given the limitations of lan-
guage, as to the constituent elements and circumstances of each of-
fense. There may be a vagueness problem, however, with one sec-
tion of the disorderly conduct statute. The section states that it
is disorderly conduct for anyone to create "a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate pur-
pose of the actor."208  The draftsmen's comments indicate that
this section will cover such activities as the "throwing of garbage
or 'stink bombs' into public passages, etc. ' 209 Despite this, the
catchall nature of the language is obvious. There is no way for the
police, the courts or the public to discern just what might be in-
cluded or excluded as criminal conduct. Due to this failure to
satisfy the due process fair notice test,210 it may be that this sec-
tion will fall under a vagueness on the face attack. Moreover,
it is only if free speech and assembly are consistently protected
as legitimate purposes that this statute will survive constitutional
attack on as applied grounds.
211
More serious questions arise with the provision which makes
criminal a knowing or intentional failure to obey a policeman's
dispersal order.212 This section is completely without precedent
205. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30.
206. Id. at 3.
207. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5501-3 (Supp. 1973).
208. Id. at § 5503.
209. Draftsmen's Comments, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 5503 (Supp.
1973).
210. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5502 (Supp. 1973).
211. "Legislation creating 'new' crimes is particularly susceptible to
constitutional attack." Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
supra note 151, at 84. It is not that such statutes are, of necessity, gen-
erically unclear; but, it is likely since they represent affirmative legislative
intrusions into areas previously left to individual freedoms. Id.
212. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5502 (Supp. 1973).
in Pennsylvania law.2 18 The only basis for the police officer's
order is his determination that a course of conduct being partici-
pated in by three or more persons is disorderly and that it causes
or may be reasonably expected to cause substantial harm or serious
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.2 14 Such language reminis-
cent of the old common law definitions which were superseded
by the new Code. And it is subject to the same objection as is any
disorderly conduct statute based on those definitions. There is
too much left to the individual police officer's discretion. True,
the dangers of abuse are modified somewhat by the requirement
of a minimum of three participants; but regardless of the num-
ber involved, the fact remains that the dispersal order is just
as likely to emanate from the officer's personal feelings concern-
ing what annoys or alarms or inconveniences him as from the true
nature of the conduct. The gravity of the consequences increases
when the conduct involves first amendment-protected activities.
Instead of completely invalidating the entire statute, which
seems to give police a new, effective crowd control device, the
courts may rule on the constitutionality of each successive appli-
cation of the statute as it is challenged. It is submitted, however,
that the as applied version of the vagueness doctrine would demand
invalidation of the statute itself.215 If the statute is capable of con-
tinued arbitrary enforcement which is violative of protected con-
stitutional freedoms, it should be struck down and redrafted.
Conceivably, all the public disorder provisions are subject to
constitutional attack for lending themselves to indiscriminate en-
forcement. While appearing legitimate on their face, these sta-
tutes, due to the nature of conduct regulated, may result in arbi-
trary enforcement practices. It remains to be seen; but it is their
only real common point of vulnerability to constitutional objec-
tion since they are not facially vague or overbroad. The courts will
have to strike the balance. If it results that one or all of these
statutes provides too much leeway to enforcing officers acting to
maintain order at the expense of individual liberties, the courts
must act to overturn convictions and invalidate the legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania legislature, through the recently enacted
Crimes Code, has attempted to balance the validly competing in-
terests in the area of public disorder law. As indicated, the new
public disorder provisions have manifest immediate advantages
over the prior law. The statutory language has been consolidated
and streamlined, the public disorder offenses and their respective
213. See text accompanying notes 155-62 supra.
214. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5502 (Supp. 1973).
215. See notes 151-64 and accompanying text supra.
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punishments are set forth in a rationally graduated scheme, and
general and overlapping definitions of the past are replaced by
more specifically-worded definitions with appropriately greater
emphasis on the intent of the offender.
With the few exceptions heretofore mentioned, 216 the statutes
are not subject to the constitutional objections of vagueness on
the face or overbreadth. For the most part, the required fair no-
tice of what conduct is prohibited is evident in the statutory lan-
guage. Any constitutional difficulties which may arise are likely
to occur only after the statutes have been in effect for a brief time.
Then it can be determined whether they are amenable to arbitrary
enforcement at the expense of preferred first amendment freedoms.
If this proves to be the case they will, of course, have to be nulli-
fied as constitutionally infirm. The role of the courts is crucial.
They must not be lulled by the patent improvements over the
1939 Penal Code treatment of public disorder offenses. They must
insist that the balance struck by the legislature between individual
freedom of expression and preservation of public peace and order
is preserved. They can accomplish this by preventing police dis-
cretion from becoming the policy-making force in this area. With
the new Code provisions on public disorder as the starting point,
the extent of judicial vigilance will determine the form of ordered
liberty which evolves in Pennsylvania.
VICTOR R. DEL.r. DONNE
216. See text accompanying notes 207-15 supra.
